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In this note I reflect on a reconstructive path for the syntax of Proto-Basque,
building on the results of Gomez and Sainz (1995), who themselves work on a
tradition started already by Astarloa two centuries ago, and of which Trask (1977)
is an excellent example. The matter is interesting not just in itself, but also in that it
may help us determine what procedures one can reliably use to figure out an
extinct linguistic entity. Section one lays out some foundations of syntactic change
from three different, yet related perspectives, which I call ‘lenses’ on syntactic
change: a theory of Universal Grammar presupposed by language learners (Principles),
a theory of Core Variation that involves the learner in the task of fixing open
dimensions (Parameters), and a putative theory of Sociological Drift that requires
learners to actually learn something and affect one another in the process. Section
two relates those three ‘lenses’ in a model, showing how specific phenomena are
best described in the interaction of these levels of linguistic reality. Section three
attempts to apply the three ‘lenses’ in question to the reconstruction of ancient
word order in proto-Basque. A conclusions-and-questions section ensues.
1. Three lenses on syntactic change
Until recently, historical linguistics was concerned with the reconstruction of
languages based on morpho-phonological characteristics of words. This is not
surprising. First, morpho-phonemics is where most consensual progress has taken
place in linguistics, surely a consequence of the fact that morpho-phonemic
evidence is the most readily available. Second, whereas it is fairly straightforward to
‘integrate’ source morpho-phonemic structures from their ‘derived’ forms after
centuries of drift, it is extremely difficult to do the same for structures whose very
essence is recursive; the reason is Saussurean arbitrariness at the morpho-phonemic
sign. Arbitrariness entails a fixed, static structure, whose only dynamicity arises as a
result of time factors. The reconstructive part has then a clear target, as it would if
it were trying to find the integral of a derivative to a simple first order function. In
contrast, a combination of signs (the raison d’etre of syntax/semantics) involves a
moving target, especially so inasmuch as we assume no upper boundary for
combinatory length. To go on with the mathematical analogy, reconstructing earlier
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structures in the syntactic instance would be like dealing with derivatives over time
of higher order functions, for which integration becomes an art.
If the space of syntactic/semantic change weren’t to some extent pre-established,
it would be hopeless to reconstruct what went on, a bit like attempting to solve a
mystery with too many uncertainties: perhaps there was a corpse, perhaps there was
a murderer, and so on, ad infinitum. Luckily though, the relevant space is extremely
constrained. This is most evident in the case of semantic variation, if there is any.
Setting aside Worfian speculations, languages don’t vary in their fundamental
intentional/conceptual characterizations of linguistic reality for semantic purposes.
No known language lacks (generalized) quantification, antecedence nuances,
individual naming, or complex argument structuring. Languages differ on whether
they divide their various conceptual spaces in thin or coarse slices, but they do not
really differ on the ability to conceptualize in pretty much the same ways. Likewise,
language use may differ on whether it deploys simpler or more cumbersome
intentional procedures for denotations of various sorts, but reference is uniform
across the species. It would thus appear that, in its essentials, human language
semantics hasn’t changed since the species got access to it. If so, change-wise there
isn’t much to account for here, and at best the issue is one of whether lexical fields
shrunk or expanded. Things are tougher in the case of syntax. We know that
radical word order changes took place over the millennia, or in the ability to drop
arguments, or in Case/agreement, elliptical, or binding systems, etc. The question
is no different from one about geographic diversity, and everyone expects that the
historical stages of languages correspond to structural forms found in some of the
existing languages in the world. In short, there are —there must be— dimensions
of syntactic variation, the so-called parameters that input data must specify, simply
because of what we witness. But again, here too we have powerful tools to constrain
our linguistic search: those very cues that a human being has for unconsciously
figuring out the language he or she is acquiring.
Although this ought to be a truism, it might need reiteration: Languages don’t
have an extra-corporeal reality, they are the products of human minds. There are
thus a priori, given our understanding of human history, only three events that
could be relevant to linguistic change: (i) Human evolution; (ii) human development;
(iii) human interactions. The first pertains to the whole species, and as such ought
to enter into a characterization of what language is, phylogenetically, not how it
changes (whatever was prior to language is by definition proto-language, thus
irrelevant to present concerns). The second event pertains to the growth of human
fetuses until we can think of them as mature, in the case of language by whatever
metric we take to characterize adult speech. The third event pertains to the very
fact of human life, with all its nuances in the case of linguistic performance. A
fortiori language change has to be defined over language acquisition and performance
by humans, both ontogenetic events. The boundaries of either of those tasks must
fall within biological, psychological, sociological or similar constraints that human
existence may be subject to —no more, no less.
With regards to the specific topic of syntactic change, general biology, psychology
or sociology have had relatively little to offer. The same isn’t true about linguistics.
In particular generative grammar has matured into a synthesis that could be
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broadly characterized as having agreed upon a few core general universal laws and a
set of open dimensions of variation manifested in the various languages of the
world. One version of the program is the Principles and Parameters (P&P) model;
there are others within generative grammar, but all of them agree on modeling
language as a universal phenomenon of the mildly-context-sensitive sort, and all of
them admit that not all of language is universal. Let’s think of this as a general
linguistic result, calling it the P&P program, setting aside, as in a normal scientific
enterprise that is still evolving, what is the exact content of the scientific predicates
in each part of the program, the universal and the particular one. There is enough
of a consensus on the major axes of that program to be able to use it as a guideline
for what ought to be the boundary conditions of linguistic change. I will refer to
this as the linguistic lens —a flexible one at this stage of our inquiry.
In addition to the linguistic lens, generative grammar has also provided us with
what we may think of as a learnability lens and a performance lens. The first of these
is based on the ‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument, the idea that it is impossible for
a learner to inductively acquire a first language. David Lightfoot in his various
works over the years has been the instigator of this particular lens, raising the
conjecture that, if there is a point at which language may ‘easily’ change syntactically,
that would be when it is acquired by a fresh mind. Granted, learnability considerations
have not been fully worked out, and thus for instance much current works goes
into elucidating the exact form of parametric triggers or cues, whether these cues
are all equally accessible to a learner or some maturation is involved, whether they
should be confined to root clauses, and so on. In this respect, this learnability lens
ought to be seen as even more flexible than the linguistic lens, but not for that as
less real: whatever turns out to be the exact path of acquisition (virtually instantaneous
or maturational, for instance), what is clear is that something in this league ought to
constrain language change.
The final lens I will be assumed is based on the idea that, for still unclear
reasons, human groups may introduce mechanisms in their behavior to distinguish
themselves from different, indeed often previous, groups. The UPenn group, with
Labov and Kroch as leaders of different aspects of relevant research, have been the
champions of this ultimately sociological lens. Of course, this third lens is even less
solid, if only because it presupposes a detailed understanding of human societies
which, for the most part, science lacks —no doubt a reflex of their complexity. In
this instance I won’t even venture to speculate what are areas of discussion, since I
don’t even know that a dominant paradigm has been established. Nonetheless, the
effect of societal pressure in language change, as I will show immediately, can be
logically inferred. Thus regardless of how clouded our vision may be, as of yet,
through this lens, we will have to make-do with what we have and try to go from
there towards a reconstruction that, otherwise, would be impossible.
Corresponding to these three lenses —a point about linguistic methodology— I
will suggest in the next section that —somewhat surprisingly as that will be a point
about linguistic reality— human language involves three separate layers, each
progressively less robust in the sense that it is less a consequence of established
natural principles. I will lay out these ideas in more familiar terms there, but in
order to be clear about the need for the sociological lens, I want to note that one
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neutral way to understand the layered structures of language is in terms of the
expression uf(pi), where u stands for ‘universal grammar’, a constant biological
specification, and f(pi) is a function characterizing a core grammar as standing in
some sort of relation with regards to individual performances, pi, where the sub-
index i ranges over human individuals. (Note, so far that only gives us two layers: u
and f ). Simply because human lives differ, two individuals sharing the very same
linguistic competence will never exhibit the exact same performance. In most
instances we presume these individual differences not to coalesce into any significant
trend. However, peripheral variants can surface if, for poorly understood reasons,
particular surface phenomena do coalesce somehow. Put differently, it is trivially
the case that, for any given value of i (for any person), the derivative of f(pi) over
time (their actual linguistic performance) is (uninterestingly) different. At the same
time, and intriguingly so, if we look not so much as each value of i in the function
above, but rather at a more abstract cut on pi intuitively dealing with some sub-
population s (for s = Σni=1 pi), one cannot fail to notice, as it were at some macroscopic
level, that patterns may emerge on structural possibilities that are not fully specified
by a core grammar. Then f(p) becomes a more abstract function over, in effect,
population dynamics (i. e. f (ΣnI=1 sI), for s the sum of individual performances just
alluded to). I have little to say about these dynamics as such, but I want to
emphasize that, aside from arguably important on their own right for one sort of
(smooth) linguistic change, they are also presupposed in the other approach to
(radical) language change that we have mentioned.
For suppose we idealize language as being a constant k, once acquired, within an
individual; the derivative of k is zero. If this were all there is to it, language
wouldn’t change at all. But of course human life is short, and new generations also
acquire k. Now say the acquisition process is some function uf(δ), where u stands
for ‘universal grammar’ and δ for ‘input data’. We know by considering the entire
human population that the output of f, though still arguably constant for a given
individual, is not constant for the species. Which is to say that the derivative of f
over time may well be interesting. This can’t be because of u, a constant; however, δ
is a reasonable culprit: input data is a priori subject to fluctuation sources. One
limiting condition of this situation emerges if generation x does not provide data δ
to generation x+1, but some outside force does. This may result in language
change, but of course of a purely external, thus sociological, nature. I don’t mean to
imply that this is trivial from the point of view of the performance lens, quite the
opposite: Kroch has argued (e.g. in 2001) that some of Lightfoot’s claims about, in
particular, the evolution of English are best understood in these sociological terms.
However, this situation is not very interesting from the point of view of the learnability
lens, since there need not be any curious property of the learner that would
account for this totally expected result: different input δ yields different output
uf(δ). A more remarkable situation would emerge, though, if from essentially the
same input δI we were to obtain different output uf(δI). Evidently, this is impossible
if not qualified; I have added the individuation subscript I to δI precisely to
indicate that, although across generations δ may be essentially the same kind of
data, individual variations glued together into population drifts may we be very
significant in making δI different, from the purposes of acquiring a grammar, from
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δJ (meaning by I and J here simply input data from different generations of
speakers of the same ‘language’).
In other words, inasmuch as grammars subjected to accepted population
dynamics (notated as ‘>>>’) of the form in (1)
(1) ΣnI=1 (Σni=1 pi )I >>> ΣnJ=1 (Σnj=1 pj )J
yield peripheral data drifts δI → δJ, then it must be that these drifts, as Lightfoot
argues, end up being responsible for changes in core grammar. That in turn
suggests that the function uf(pi) that we started this discussion with must be
understood as ufvt(pi), where f is a complex function that at least in part relates
parametric values v to what we may think of as peripheral trainings t. It is not my
intention in this note to clarify just how it is that, in effect, linguistic growth (parameter
values) and linguistic learning (peripheral trainings) relate to one another. The
point is, simply, that it must be in this way that we resolve the, otherwise absurd,
situation for linguistic change that Lightfoot hypothesized, leading to parameter
value resetting of the catastrophic sort.
2. The Assumed Model
Those abstract considerations can be made concrete within the P&P model.
Let’s first examine, in that respect, instances of the Polysynthesis parameter (in the
sense of Mark Baker’s), which gives different values for English and Basque: while
the latter case-marks the main verbal arguments (subject ergative, object absolutive,
indirect object dative) and exhibits them as agreement elements in the verbal
auxiliary, the former does neither. Correspondingly, English disallows pro-drop
(2a), presents a fixed word-order, and allows extractions from nominal objects (4a),
whereas Basque can drop any of the main verbal arguments (2b), allows any of the
orders in (3), and disallows extractions from nominal objects (4b); ‘pied-piping’
extractions are fine in both languages:
(2) a. *(I) love *(Lucy).
b. maite nuen ‘I love him/her/it’
Love I-AUX-III
(3) a. Nik maite nuen Lucy. ‘I love Lucy.’ (OK in English)
b. Lucy nik maite nuen. ‘Lucy I love.’ (OK in English only with topicalization)
c. Nik Lucy maite nuen. (Permutations OK too) ‘I Lucy love.’ (etc. all * in English)
(4) a. Who has John seen [pictures of t]?
b. *Noren ikusi ditu [t argazkiak] Jonek (‘Of whom has John seen pictures?’)
who-gen see III-AUX-III pictures-abs Jon-erg
(5) a. [Pictures of whom] has John seen t?
b. [Noren argazkiak] t ikusi ditu Jonek ‘Pictures of whom has John seen?’
who-gen pictures-abs see III-AUX-III Jon-erg
This is the expected situation in parametric choices, which typically correspond
to low-level morphological facts (case, agreement) and have vast consequences for
the grammar at large (in terms of syntactic conditions of all sorts).
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Importantly, neither the Basque nor the English value of that particular parameter
seem to be more marked than the other. Suppose we think of markedness in classical
Pa-ninian terms, via the Subset Principle. Whenever we find situations whereby a
set of structures in language L is a subset of a larger class of structures in language
L’, we assume that the language acquisition device (LAD) must hypothesize that it is
acquiring language L unless presented with direct positive evidence for a structure
in the superset. Had the LAD hypothesized, in the absence of such confirmation,
that it was learning the language corresponding to the larger set, the only way it
could retreat from a mistaken assumption is by way of analyzing negative data.
Which is the larger set of structures related to (and therefore, which can set) this
particular parameter —the Basque or the English one? If we go with the evidence
in (3), the Basque structure is the superset (as more grammatical combinations with
the same words and identical grammatical relations are possible in this language); but
if we go with the evidence in (4) and (5), the opposite is the case. So the LAD
cannot decide which one is the unmarked option. That is not problematic, so long
as robust positive evidence exists for each option of the parameter. The evidence is
overwhelming if we allow the child to unconsciously analyze the syntactic properties
of sentences. An English speaking child cannot help but find the strongly con-
figurational language that structures of the sort in (1a) imply. There are very small
departures from this kind of evidence, such as the exotic topicalized (3b), with
special intonation and (for most people) restricted to main clauses. But the
evidence for the Basque child is equally strong: every Basque sentence presents an
inflected auxiliary and either dropped arguments or overtly case-marked ones, both
hall-marks of the opposite setting in the Polysynthesis parameter. In the presence of
robust evidence for both settings, learning either is trivial, and there is no logical
need to postulate an unmarked option which could not be learned on the basis of
only positive data.
Not all parametric situations are like that. Compare languages, like Spanish,
which allow clitic-doubling, and languages like English that don’t, as in (6):
(6) a. Juan la está viendo (a María) (Juan is seeing María)
Juan ’er is seeing to María
b. John is seeing’er (*Mary)
Let’s call whatever is involved in this difference the Clitic Parameter. Inasmuch
as doubling is optional (6a), the set of structures it allows is a super-set of the set of
structures associated to absence of doubling (6b). One could argue that, just as (4b)
is impossible in languages with object agreement, so too is (7) impossible:
(7) *De quién las  está viendo [a amigas t] (‘Who is s/he seeing friends?’)
of whom ’em is seeing to friends
However, that would be an unfair comparison. This is because (8a) is as gram-
matical in Spanish, crucially without a clitic, as its English version in (8b) is:
(8) a. ? De quién  está viendo [amigas t] (‘Who is s/he seeing friends of?’)
of whom is seeing friends
b. ? Who is s/he seeing [friends of ]?
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Note that one cannot build, in a language with obligatory agreement like
Basque, a version of (8a) without agreement. That is one of the central differences
between clitics and agreement markers: the latter are not dropped. Note the
consequence of this state of affairs: a grammatical version of (7) exists in Spanish,
so in this instance there is arguably no structure that the English version of the
Clitic Parameter allows which Spanish doesn’t, and hence English is, in this
domain, a genuine subset of Spanish.
The subset situation just described doesn’t entail that Spanish (the marked
option) will take longer for a child to learn. If as we did in the previous paragraph,
we allow the child access to second-order grammatical descriptions of available data
(as first suggested by Dresher 1998), then it may well be that the evidence cueing
even the marked option of the parameter happens to be readily available for a child
to use. That highlights the difference between the current P&P model and a more
traditional proposal (such as the Aspects model of Chomsky 1965) in which learners
always compare grammars in terms of the first-order linguistic structures (sentence
tokens) that they license. In genuine parametric terms, a set comparison of the sort
alluded to may be relevant only in situations of a learning conflict, where higher-
order evidence leads to ambiguous analyses. Still, the scenario outlined in the
previous paragraph is important in principle, and arguably central in fact for
situations of successful language change. After all, there may well be a historical
stage in which a learner lacks a strong way of directly deciding whether the
language being acquired involves genuine syntactic clitics (as opposed to merely
reduced phonological forms, which all languages have in casual speech). In scenarios
where that grammatical ambiguity ensues, it is only natural for children to resort to
first-order data analyses, going with the subset condition in the absence of direct
observation of grammatical tokens of the superset sort.
But there has to be more to linguistic differences than mere parametric settings,
whether they are of the subset sort or not. Chomsky is very explicit in 1981 about
the role of idealization and how that relates to the notions we are considering. He
says that:
. . . what are called ‘languages’ or ‘dialects’ or even ‘idiolects’ will [not
conform] to the systems determined by fixing the parameters of UG. . . each
actual ‘language’ will incorporate a periphery of borrowings, historical residues,
inventions, and so on, which we can hardly expect to —and indeed would not
want to— incorporate within a principled theory of UG.
Nonetheless, Chomsky also emphasizes that ‘outside the domain of core
grammar we do not expect to find chaos. Marked structures have to be learned on
the basis of slender evidence too, so there should be further structure to the system’.
While that is reasonable, it is difficult to pin down the nature of that further
structure. Chomsky says:
. . . we assume that the child approaches the task [of language acquisition]
equipped with UG and an associated theory of markedness that serves two
functions: it imposes a preference structure on the parameters of UG, and it
permits the extension of core grammar to a marked periphery.
TOWARDS A SYNTAX OF PROTO-BASQUE 955
The first of these functions is obvious, and has been discussed above; the second
one is less so. It is trivial if what we mean by ‘periphery’ is simply a core grammar
with marked options set. However, there is no reason why all ‘borrowings, historical
residues, inventions, and so on’ (where the ‘so on’ could be pretty vast) ought to be
that clean.
Consider a situation that arises with questions involving the operator why. First,
it should be said that in many languages regular argumental operators such as who
trigger, upon fronting an information question, an ancillary verb movement,
involving an auxiliary (as in the English (8a)) or the main verb itself (as in the
Spanish (8b)):
(8) a. [Who [has [John [ t [seen t ]]]]]? (cf. *Who John has seen t?)
^ ^_ _ _ _ _/ /
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ /
b. ¿[A quién [vio [Pedro [t [  t t]]]]] (cf. *¿A quién Pedro vio?)
to whom saw Pedro /^ / /
^ ^_ _ _ _ _/ |_/ /
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _/
Why the verb movement is required has been a topic of much discussion.
Suffice it to say that a sentence boundary (technically, a CP) is (in most languages)
a barrier, and the ‘barrierhood’ of this category disappears if the CP is in construction
with a lexical head:
(9) L(exical)-marking Convention
XP is not a barrier if it is in construction with a lexical head Y.
Where X is in construction with Y if X=Y or X is selected by Y.
(The disjunction in (9) disappears if categorial identity is a trivial sub-case of
selection). By the L-marking Convention (LC), an embedded CP does not require
verbal inversion of the sort above. Thus, compare (8a) to (10a), which does not
involve verb movement:
(10) a. [I wonder [CP who [ John [has [seen t]]]]]
b. ... [CP C [IP John [has [VP seen who]]]]
(10b) goes back in the derivation to the point prior to the displacement of who
(simplifying the structure for expository purposes). Suppose all XPs along the way
are potential barriers for this displacement, keeping in mind that an XP is just the
maximal projection of X at some derivational step, whatever X may be. VP is in
construction with a lexical head, namely its own; as a result VP is not a barrier for
the movement of who. Of course, by this sort of reasoning, all categories headed by
a substantive head will not be barriers to displacement. If the T head of IP also
counts as substantive, then IP will not be a barrier either. Finally, how about CP?
Its head is the abstract C, thus clearly not substantive. But is it in construction with
a selecting element? It is if the CP is selected by wonder. Then CP is not a barrier
either, though not for intrinsic reasons (its own head), but rather by way of its
contextual properties (the selector that licenses the structure in the derivation).
956 JUAN URIAGEREKA
This is the step missing in (8a), where nothing selects the relevant CP. As a result,
the only way CP will cease to be a barrier is if it incorporates a neighboring lexical
head, in which case the combined projection will be in construction with an
appropriate L-marker. That is precisely what head movement achieves:
(11) [CP has-C [IP John [ t [VP seen who]]]]
^_ _ _ _ _ _ _/
Observe that the displacement of the verb does not cross the CP, but adjoins
instead to the head C, and is thus legitimate. In contrast, the displaced who must
cross CP, but this category is no longer a barrier after verb movement, in the
manner indicated. The reasoning is rounded up by the assumption that the
mechanism in (11) is, in some relevant sense, costly, which is why the grammar
does not undertake it if not necessary; hence inversion in the circumstances in (10)
is not acceptable.
Assuming a system along those lines, the question arises about structures
involving adjunction to CP itself, which thus should not cross this element to
begin with. As Rizzi (1990) has indicated, this situation arises for causal modifiers,
and therefore for corresponding questions involving the operator why. The logic is
clear. Why questions involving one level of embedding should not trigger verb
preposing as discussed above; however, why questions involving two levels of
embedding should. In other words, (12a) should be grammatical, alongside with
(12d), while both (12b) and (12c) should be bad:
(12) a. Why [CP John has seen Mary] t? 
b. * Why has [CP John seen Mary] t? 
c. * Why [CP you have thought [CP John has seen Mary] t] ?
d. Why have [CP you thought [CP John has seen Mary] t] ?
In (12a) why does not have to cross CP, thus it should be unnecessary to move
has as in (12b) to void the barrierhood of this CP. In contrast, although why in
(12c) does not have to cross the embedded CP it modifies, it does have to move
across the matrix CP in its displacement to the clausal periphery; hence this time
ancillary verbal displacement to the C head is justified. Speaker judgements about
(12c) and (12d) accord with the theoretical prediction. However, judgments about
(12a) and (12b) are backwards ( in (12)).
That is not so with English-speaking children who, as Crain and Thornton
(1998) show, provide just the judgments in (12). Spanish too presents almost the
same paradigm:
(13) a. ¿Por qué [CP Juan vio a María] t? ‘Why Juan saw María?’
why John saw to María]
b. ¿Por qué vio [CP Juan a  María] t? ‘Why did Juan see María?’
why saw John to María]
c. *¿Por qué [CP tú pensaste que [CP Juan vio a  María] t ]? ‘Why you thought that
why you thought that John saw to María] John saw María?’
d. ¿Por qué pensaste [CP tú que [CP Juan vio a   María] t ]? ‘Why did you think that
why thought you that John saw to María John saw María?’
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The parallel is not total, since both (13a) (involving no verbal displacement)
and (13b) (involving it) are possible. Nonetheless, facts are similar enough for
Crain and Thornton to make their point: in their view of things, children
acquiring a language L cannot make a ‘mistake’ which does not correspond to a
parametric option in some other language L’ (their Continuity Hypothesis).
Suppose they are correct, a question remains: what is responsible for the English
pattern in (12) (or related to this question, why is the Spanish (13b) —involving
what looks like a costly and unnecessary option— also an option alongside the
predicted (13a))? Actually, vernacular versions of English present the pattern in
(12) as well, and upon closer examination, the Spanish (13a) belongs to a more
relaxed register than (13b). It is possible that the verb preposing in (12b) or (13b)
is one of those ‘peripheral inventions’ that Chomsky was referring to, achieved on
analogy with instances of verb preposing where it is needed in order to eliminate a
barrier by way of the LC in (9). That would explain why children continue to use
the pattern predicted by the theory sometimes into early puberty (always beyond
normal stages of acquisition), as do ‘uneducated’ speakers. This is not to say, of
course, that the prestige or educated adult pattern is not psychologically real. It is
very possible, however, that its acquisition constitutes a genuine instance of learning,
and as such is entirely different from whatever is involved in more elementary
parameters which I have likened to growing.
As with other instances of linguistic diversity, we do not know for sure that this
type of analysis of why questions is ultimately correct. As Chomsky asked in
(1981):
How do we delimit the domain of . . . marked periphery? . . . [E]vidence from
language acquisition would be useful [, but is] insufficient to provide much
insight. . . We are therefore compelled to rely heavily on grammar-internal
considerations and comparative evidence, that is, on the possibilities of constructing
a reasonable theory of UG and considering its explanatory power in a variety of
language types.
If we base our conclusions on what is a reasonable theory of UG, we have
something to say about, in particular, verb preposing for argumental questions, but
not so much for similar processes involving causal modification questions. That
said, it seems significant that late acquisition of verb preposing in why environments,
or its absence in spontaneous speech in many instances, should correlate with the
theoretical conclusion. This strongly suggests that there is room for a significant,
systematic Periphery of a sort that seems profoundly different from whatever is
involved in the constitution of I-language.
The diagram in Figure I is intended to convey this fundamental difference
(growth vs. learning) between the combinatorial systems of language and those
which are based on an ultimately sociological exchange. In the terms discussed in
the first section, for a complex function ufvt(pi) that relates parametric values v to
peripheral trainings t, UG in the adjacent diagram is the u constant in the function;
the core in the diagram is ufv (pi) in the function, which eventually becomes an I-
language when all the v (parametric) values are set through input data δ for a given
individual i. Note that the transition from the Core to the I-language in Figure I is 
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Figure I
From I-language to the Periphery
not signaled in the function as such; this is because it is not an architectural issue,
but an acquisition one: data for the Core, if available, are direct second-order analyses
of δ, while data to entirely set an I-language may need to involve indirect first-
order analyses of δ in subset situations. (In principle, Core and I-language may end
up coinciding if either there is no second order δ for the child to set or no sub-set
situations where first order δ become relevant). Finally, the periphery in the diagram
is ufvt(pi) (the whole function), which becomes what we normally understand as a
language when all the t (learning) trainings are determined, also through input data
δ for i.
A model of grammar of the sort in Figure I may undergo interesting patterns of
change. Suppose a sociological drift takes place in some peripheral construction
(e.g. an augmentation of displacement processes of the sort in (13) for expressive
purposes). That, in itself —if it becomes stable enough to last— will of course
constitute a bona fide instance of linguistic change (and it would presumably
present the characteristic ‘S’-shaped curves of such transitions). For my purposes
here, however, the most interesting consequence that such an S-shaped curve may
end up having is with regards to the data, δ. A learner doesn’t consciously discriminate
between what I have called second-order or first-order δ, or for that matter δ for
the purposes of ufv(pi) and δ for the purposes of ufvt(pi) as a whole. Data are data.
However, we already saw that the first and second-order interpretation of δ is quite
different: in one instance sets of tokens are relevant, whereas in the other, instead,
what counts are grammatical structures. Similarly, what we may think of as δc (for
core settings) are interpreted by the system differently from what can be regarded as
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δp (for peripheral learning). In principle, all of this is no different from the use a
given organism may have for a key protein first in a purely genetic mechanism,
later on in the life of the organism in epigenetic processes, and eventually in metabolic
exchange. In our terms, the very same δ is first used in setting core parametric
values (first of the cueing sort, next in terms of set evaluation), and eventually in
whatever mechanics are involved in establishing peripheral patterns. This hierarchy
is crucial in the dynamics for language change. An innocent-looking drift in δ (an
S-type process of the sociological sort) cannot be kept from affecting those aspects
of the data that may tilt the ufv(pi) part of the equation. For instance, a simple
frequency change of the peripheral sort can, no matter how rarely, affect the first-
order subset conditions for a learner to set the paradigmatic value(s) of a subset
dimension like the Clitic Parameter. A change of the latter sort may in turn, again
if only sporadically, imply the emergence of further sorts of evidence which, when
analyzed at a second-order, result in different conditions for a learner to set a core
dimension like the Polysynthesis Parameter. That’s Lightfoot’s rationale. If this sort
of, in his own words, catastrophic sort of change may occur with any probability
higher than zero, it will result in a non-linear curve, signaling a drastic syntactic
change within a few generations (one or two, in the limit).
3. Reconstructing Basque Syntax from Auxiliary Morphology
In understanding what I have to say about the possible course of change from
Proto-Basque to Basque, it is important to realize that a hierarchy is being assumed:
(14) Peripheral change > Subset change > Core change
This is the most realistic course of radical linguistic change: a disturbance emerges
in the periphery of a language which manages to cascade through interesting
consequences for the first-order analysis of δ, the data available to a language
learner, and eventually δ’s second-order analysis. This course of action is not
necessary: a disturbance in the Periphery may simply stay there, and even if it
manages to affect an I-language, it may never trickle down to Core parametric
options. Nonetheless, if a radical language change is to take place, logic dictates
that it proceed in the manner assumed in (14) —unless it is directly imposed by
outside forces (e.g. a foreign invasion or forced enslaving dramatically changing
input data for a generation of children). It could be argued that the hierarchy in
(14) could ‘skip’ a step. Logically that is possible, although it is hard to imagine
what sort of trivial change in the periphery —a first-order one— may be such that
it, and it alone (without a subsequent change in the I-language), can affect the way
in which data are analyzed at a second-order at the core. If this situation emerges it
requires careful argumentation. At the same time, and putting aside irrelevant
language change of an external sort, the present logic does not expect a direct
change to occur either in the I-language or in the Core. While it is possible for a
generation of adults, following societal pressures, to change their first-order data, it
is impossible for them to engage in more elaborate manipulations, as it is impossible
for children to change anything at all: they simply analyze data. In other words,
while the cause for radical language change may be children, the trigger must be
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adults (because they change sociological patterns, or they invade/enslave one
another). Differently put, the linguistic lens forces us to look at data both from the
performance and the acquisition lenses, in that order.
That said, the main idea from the Gomez and Sainz paper (henceforth G&S)
that I want to address here is their claim that ‘Basque had a V1 order at a certain
stage… This situation was responsible for the reanalysis of connectives as person
markers and ultimately for the phenomenon of ergative displacement’ (section 6.3).
The methodology that G&S uses to reach this conclusion is very sound. First they
carefully study the constituent elements of finite verb forms in Basque (root, person
and number affixes, and event markers for mood, tense and aspect), together with
the conditions of split ergativity witnessed in the language, from the earliest
(sixteenth century) surviving texts. Next, they take seriously the traditional
conjecture that, in particular, personal agreement markers have their historical
origin as incorporated personal pronouns. Then they proceed to analyze the more
complex (and in their plausible view, later) origin of number forms, finally
discussing event-related markers. Finally, they ask the question that interests me
here: how is it possible for a finite verb form to incorporate all those elements?
A by now familiar dictum by Givon in (1973) asserts that ‘today’s morphology
is yesterday’s syntax’. The intuition behind this bold assertion is that morphology
acts as a reflex of syntax by somehow ‘grammaticalizing’ syntactic patterns. Of course,
if one doesn’t believe in the extra corporeal reality of grammars, ‘grammaticalizations’
ought to be made compatible with the sort of system sketched in the previous
section and summarized in (14) above. In broad terms, the obvious intuition to
pursue, much in the spirit of Clark and Roberts (1993), is that ‘grammaticalization’
is performed by language learners, upon simply reanalyzing originally periphrastic
sequences as word-level units. For that a couple of things must happen: (i) that the
periphrastic sequences are stable enough for a language learner to analyze them as
(presumably simpler) units; and (ii) that they were not stable in the particular sense
in (i) prior to the point of misanalysis. In addition, for us linguists to reconstruct
what went on in history, a third desideratum must be met: (iii) that morphological
rules haven’t destroyed the evidence of prior syntax. Let’s consider each of these
important points in turn in order to analyze the plausibility of claiming that Basque
was a V1 language at the point of creating its finite verb system.
Intuitively, desideratum (i) asserts something as simple as claiming that the
noun, say, pickpocket, emerges in analyzing as a unit the frequently co-occurring
verb pick and noun pocket. But needless to say even there we start seeing an issue: it
obviously isn’t the case that pick and pocket always co-occur; they just have co-
occurred frequently enough in the (relatively recent) history of English for someone
to put them together, with the innovation somehow sticking. Granted, this trivial
example involves substantive lexical items, whereas what interests us here is the
formation of verbal paradigms. But still, the pickpocket example highlights a point
of principle: just how frequently must grammatical form x co-occur with grammatical
form y for them to be turned into something that learners acquire as the unit x-y? I
don’t know of any answer to that question, but it seems to me rather easy to prove
that the answer cannot be ‘all the time’. Take for instance the origin of complementizer
whether in English, which is known to have emerged from the morphological
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merger of which and either. Clearly it could not have been that these two words
were always coupled together, or they would never have remained separate in the
language. The same thing can be said about complementizer como in Spanish,
originating from the vernacular Latin quo modo; plainly, Spanish has retained
separate words originating from quod and from modo. The examples that come to
mind are too numerous to mention, so the conclusion seems inescapable:
(15) Grammaticalization g does not require constant co-occurrence of its con-
stituents.
That moves me to desideratum (ii). One other reason to believe the claim in (15)
is that a grammaticalization g takes place at some point t in time. Simply put, if the
conditions for g had been met prior to t, then g should have occurred prior to t as
well. But we don’t expect things to be like that in any dynamic system: transitions
take place only when certain limiting conditions are reached —the proverbial straw
that breaks the camel’s back. If so, what we expect in grammaticalizations is some
sloping curve that can create the conditions for a change, which then takes place.
This makes sense from the point of view of language learners receiving data δ,
assuming that:
(16) (i) A language learner acts economically.
(ii) It is more economical to pre-compile a symbol sequence <x, y> as a
word w than as separate symbols x, y.
From the point of view of the grammaticalization, then, we should expect that:
(17) Grammaticalization g is a transition at a time t from a syntactic state s to a
morphological state m when the δ evidence for learners allows for their
most economical analysis whereby s > m (i.e. morphology trumps syntax).
Prior to t, δ evidence is just too scarce for the desired analysis from the learner.
The transition from s to m may be more or less drastic (linear or non-linear)
depending on where in the hierarchy in (14) the change in question falls: whether
it is Peripheral (as possibly lexical changes of the pickpocket sort are) or Paradigmatic
(as ought to be the case with both Subset —e.g. expansion/reduction of paradigms
—and Core changes —for instance in value for the Polysynthesis Parameter).
Regardless, given this state of affairs, it cannot be the case that a linguistic change
happens at either limiting situation (total absence or total presence) for δ, unless
there is some sort of drastic invasion or some such thing that directly changes the
nature of δ for a generation of learners.
Finally, desideratum (iii) above is methodological. Any unqualified version of
Givon’s grammaticalization claim is bound to be false, for the simple reason that we
know (as amply shown for instance in Anderson 1992) that morphology too has
rules. That said, all we can do is hope for the best. If in particular Baker is right in
(1988) and subsequent works, morphology, or more narrowly inflectional morphology,
is of the sort that mirrors the syntax that goes into it, in fact even synchronically.
That is the strongest sort of condition one can hope for, if G&S is to be taken
seriously, for that work is essentially claiming that the synchronic inflectional
morphology of the Basque finite verb wears the syntax it came from on its sleeve. If
962 JUAN URIAGEREKA
so, that is a wonderful fossil record to reconstruct the origins of Basque syntax
from, mainly because we are so lucky that the Basque verb happens to be so rich in
its morphology. At the same time, even if one has perfectly fossilized remains of
anything, one still needs good reconstructive science to figure out what went on.
This entire note can be seen in that light, as an attempt to use the linguistic,
learnability and performance lenses to help us test the reconstruction of Basque
syntax, and in particular the claim that it was verb initial.
The reason G&S wants the Basque verb to be verb initial —involving a verb
movement very much along the lines of (8) above— is that, in this context, around
the verb root ‘a number of clitic-like elements [of the sort in (6) above] were
attached in such a way that a kind of verbal complex was created’ (cf. the examples
in (2) to (5) above, where the auxiliary shows rich personal morphology in a
positive value for the Polysynthesis Parameter). Why couldn’t these elements be
attached if the verb were any lower? The tacit assumption is that in lower contexts
there wouldn’t be enough structural height for the verb to be systematically close to
the would-be morphemes. The point can be illustrated in the following diagram
(word order is orthogonal to the point being made). Suppose a syntactic derivation
for a transitive structure involves (18):
(18) is the standard Minimalist phrase-marker, but any other one with similar
properties would do for our purposes. The key is that the verb starts its derivational
life ‘low’, associated to the direct object, its thematic subject being associated to an
auxiliary verbal element v. Verbal arguments may displace to higher vP or TP
specifiers for Case/agreement purposes, while the verb itself may move, head-to-
head, all the way up to the C projection. Whenever I say operations may take place,
it is because a parameter could be involved (thus the English verb apparently
doesn’t move as high within the clausal skeleton as the Spanish verb, etc.). The key
point is this. The traditional intuition has always been that verbal (personal) agreement
emerges in history from cliticization of D argumental elements. If Baker is generally
right, this presupposes the process of Incorporation, which must satisfy the fol-
lowing principle:
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(19) Principle of Incorporation
An incorporation process from x to y takes place only if y c-commands x.
If (19) holds, then it is immediately true that incorporation of anything to a
verb presupposes the verb being ‘high enough’ (in c-command terms) for the
incorporation to take place; for subject and object clitics, that must be C. G&S
generalizes this result to other verbal morphemes, but the same point holds: whatever
incorporates to a verb presupposes a structurally high verb. Hence the verb must be
in C to succeed in the task.
I agree with this result. The only ways to prove it wrong would be either to
show that morphology in Basque doesn’t obey mirror conditions of the sort Baker
analyzed, or else to deny (19) altogether, in which case no strong conclusion about
verbal height directly ensues (a possibility explored for instance in Di Sciullo and
Williams 1988). However, I find the explanation interesting enough, and the
theory behind it sufficiently strong, not to challenge that premise. What I want to
focus on, however, is the issue of whether in order to have the verb sufficiently high
to be able to host incorporated elements, it must be in C all the time —in other
words, whether as they claim the grammatical order of Basque at the time must
have been VSO (or putatively VOS).
That claim is radical, especially in light of the fact that modern Basque is almost
certainly underlyingly SOV or perhaps SVO (in part depending on whether the
conclusions in Kayne (1994) are tenable and whether, in contrast, there may exist a
Head Parameter determining the order of a verb and its direct object). To realize this,
compare the assertion that Proto-Basque was VSO with Trask’s (1977) contention that
Basque was originally SVO and it became SOV as a result of the emergence of an
ergative system in the language. A priori, that position is easier to justify, from the
viewpoint of the linguistic lens. In particular, this is an expected change, both
typologically and synchronically: as Trask (1979) already observes, SVO languages are
never ergative. But going from a VSO order to a SOV order is no trivial task. To put
this in perspective, let’s consider first what may be involved in the different verbal
positions (higher or lower in the clausal skeleton in (18)). In a nutshell, if it were
possible for it, a verb would always stay lowest in the clausal skeleton, thus yielding
SOV or SVO orders (depending on whether the object itself can appear on either
side). This is because such a solution is the most economical (involving less
displacement), which accords well with the fact that newly formed creole languages
—by hypothesis starting with default parametric settings in the absence of gramma-
ticalized morphological markings— are typically SVO (Bickerton 1990). So why does
the verb ever move higher, then, to the inflectional projections of T, C or others? All
other things being equal, to implement some form of morphological checking, as
G&S correctly assumes following Chomsky (1995). If so, it would be sufficient for a
child to misanalyze the need for morphological checking at a higher site (C, for the
VSO order) for the economy strategies of grammar to yield a lower movement site (if
any) for the verb. That’s actually good news for the G&S hypothesis: all that it requires
is to supplement the already argued for idea with the addendum that, at some time in
the historical change from Proto-Basque to Basque, the language somehow lost
morphological ‘strength’ in the C (presumably also T) areas, which resulted in the verb
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not having any business going higher that it needed to. That does model the correct
change —if, that is, the morphological weakening can be substantiated.
Here an interesting tension arises. Let’s call transition time t0 the one whereby
personal clitics are integrated into the verb as agreement markers —and keep in
mind that this involves a setting of the Core Polysynthesis Parameter. As per
generalization (17), there must have existed a time t-1, prior t0, whereby the
periphrastic construction(s) that give raise to the morphological reanalysis haven’t
been reanalyzed yet. And in turn there must have been a different time t-2 where
either the periphrastic constructions themselves hadn’t emerged yet because the
relevant clitics weren’t in place, or else the verb wasn’t high enough to be in the sort
of position that it, by hypothesis, occupies at t-1, which is what eventually allows
the reanalysis at t0. Certainly at time t-1, and arguably at time t-2 (if the periphrastic
constructions hadn’t emerged), the verb must have already been high enough to be
able to result in the t0 reanalysis, which in turn entails that Proto-Basque at the
time must have had ‘strong’ morphology in C to trigger the costly verbal move to
that site. The questions then are these: if throughout a period t-2/0 Proto-Basque
had strong morphology in C, why did it eventually lose it and what was the time t1
when that happened? Note that as per the logic of the hierarchy in (14), the t-2/0
period must have been either externally accelerated, or else a rather long one (to
allow for the integration of a peripheral drift into a Core parametric option). That
result holds all the more so if, as G&S correctly argues, not all the integrations in
the Basque verbal morphology are co-temporaneous, which presupposes a period
whereby the verb is high enough to incorporate (different) personal markers,
number markers, and event-related markers. The same conclusion can be reached
about the t0/1 interval (the length of this period depending in part on whether Verb
Movement parameters are either Subset or Core ones). This is then the crux of my
question: the interesting G&S proposal is missing one non-trivial component to be
fully accepted. In the period t-1/1 (possibly t-2/1) Basque went from lacking ‘strong’
morphology in C, to having it, to losing it yet again. That plainly requires either of
two very intriguing premises: (i) there may have been (an) unexpected outside
influence(s) in the verbal syntax of Proto-Basque, or (ii) the time period t-2/1 is
extraordinarily long —in the order of millennia, not centuries.
A less drastic alternative is that proto-Basque wasn’t a V1 language, after all.
Notice that all the G&S requires, especially given desideratum (i) above (which
merely requires enough stability in the desired periphrastic forms), is that the tensed
verb be in C with sufficient frequency for learners to be “fooled” into reanalyzing
periphrastic forms as synthetic. That isn’t difficult. Consider the well-known
phenomenon of galdegaia in modern Basque, or the requirement that focused
elements be left-adjecent to verbal forms. Concentrate in particular in the Northern,
root-clause-driven form of the phenomenon, which is also the most archaic (and is
preserved in the Southern varieties only in emphatic and negative contexts).
Relevant examples have the shape in (20):
(20) Lucy ba nuen nik maite!
Lucy-abs indeed III-Aux-I I-erg love
‘It is Lucy who I do love!’
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Here the tensed verb is high, where G&S expects it —in a language which is
underlyingly SOV. This is important, because if this is a domain that is readily
accessible to language learners, and it appears with sufficient frequency for them to
consider economical the appropriate grammaticalization, then we have modeled the
G&S results, albeit without having made any difficult-to-justify charges regarding the
syntax of Proto-Basque.
It is quite remarkable that the situation in (20) should be specific of main clauses,
and in that respect counts as what Lightfoot (1991) and elsewhere calls ‘Degree-0’.
Simply put, whereas one could have a main clause without an embedded one, the
latter is impossible; hence the frequency of main clauses is overwhelmingly higher (in
the vicinity of 98%) than the frequency of embedded clauses. That statistical fact
alone makes main clauses the most important repository of systematic data for
children. Now crucially, main clauses typically present so-called root transformations,
of the sort sketched in (8) vs. (10) above, which Laka (1990) persuasively argued is
essentially of the same sort as (20). Lightfoot has shown that children typically induce
catastrophic language changes in the direction of whatever surface forms they can
detect from main clauses, reanalyzing I-language parameters on the basis of this sort
of evidence. In (1999) Lightfoot shows that it is enough for children to obtain data
patterns in the vicinity of 30% of a regularity (vis-à-vis absence of that regularity in
comparable contexts) for them to be lead astray into reanalyzing particular input data
as setting a parameter value that is different from the target one. Extrapolating from
this appreciation in the realm that Lightfoot was stydying, it might have been enough
for children acquiring Proto-Basque to receive data of the form in (20) with a 30%
frequency, or any such relatively low frequency (vis-à-vis similar constructions, albeit
of a non-emphatic sort, whereby the verb doesn’t appear in the left periphery) for
them to reset the Polysynthesis parameter in the direction that G&S expects.
It may be argued that learners of Proto-Basque wouldn’t have reset that Core
parameter if they could analyze data like (20) as emphatic, focused, or some such
thing, thereby unconsciously realizing that the order in (20) isn’t basic. However,
Crain and Thornton (1998) have shown that, whereas they are extremely sensitive
to core syntactic and semantic information, young children are not particularly well
attuned to general pragmatic information. Emphasis and focus involve a complex
interplay of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic information, so it is not surprising if
a child hearing a sentence like (20) may be more sensitive to its syntax/semantics
than its pragmatics, as a result of which the possibility of misnalysis is in principle
there. What remains to be seen is whether one has a way of determining the frequency
of sentences of the sort in (20) within a normal sample of primary linguistic data.
We won’t be able to search for an answer on (non-existing) archaic data. But we
may find relevant comparisons by analyzing present-day northern dialects, which
should most closely resemble the archaic forms.
4. Conclusions
The G&S results have placed the issue of Proto-Basque reconstruction in a win-
win situation: all of the possible scenarios that lead to these results are interesting.
The possibilities that we have considered are summarized (in reverse order) in (21):
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(21) a. Proto-Basque was underlyingly the same as modern Basque (modulo
the further issue of whether it independently changed for ergativity
reasons).
b. Proto-Basque was underlyingly V1, and it remained thus for a very
long period of time, until it lost morphological strength at C and it
became SVO (or SOV, modulo ergativity considerations); the scenario
presupposes a Proto-Proto-Basque that was not V1 (or did not have
relevant periphrastic constructions to reanalyze).
c. The changes from Proto-Proto-Basque to Proto-Basque, and from
Proto-Basque to Basque, were accelerated by drastic outside forces.
Scenario (21a) is arguably the null hypothesis, pending confirmation about how
much data of the V1 sort (without the language being underlyingly V1) is required
for the G&S reanalysis to occur. It is captivating because it suggests that Basque
hasn’t undergone significant syntactic changes (at least in this (set of ) parameter(s))
for the longest time. Scenario (21b) requires an even longer stretch of time to be in
play, since it involves two Core parametric re-settings, which given the hierarchy in
(14) must have gone through the usual slope of Peripheral drift, Sub-set reanalysis
and final Core change. It wouldn’t be surprising if the necessary changes for the
plausibility of scenario in (21b), which refers to a state of Proto-Basque that is prior
to contact with Latin, throw us back another couple of thousand years, to the eve
of civilization. Finally, scenario (21c) is perhaps the most fascinating, especially in
light of claims that Proto-Basque may have had a European extension that is vaster
than commonly assumed. The issue here is that this scenario requires language
contact —of a pretty drastic sort. Historical times have shown relatively little
structural contact between Basque and its various neighbors, but what happened in
(even recent) prehistoric times is anybody’s guess. It is conceivable that a broader
(Proto-)Proto-Basque did have contacts with several neighbors. This is the most
speculative scenario, but not because of that the least intriguing. Which adds up to
showing that taking the linguistic, learnability and performance lenses seriously
leads to exciting reconstructive processes, and perhaps even reliable ones.
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